Employee’s Electrocution Death Falls Within Exclusive Remedy Provision of Workers Compensation and Not in Circuit Court Intentional Tort Action

Yesterday, the Court of Appeal released its published opinion after remand as on leave granted from the Supreme Court in the case of Bagby v. Detroit Edison.12.16.2014, holding that the estate of an employee electrocuted while working for the public utility company could not plead around the exclusive remedy provisions of Michigan’s Workers Disability Compensation Act.  Workers compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy under Michigan law for employees injured “arising out of” and “in the course of” their employment.  MCL 418.131(1), the so-called “intentional tort” exception allows a circuit court, rather than the workers compensation agency (and the attendant administrative apparatus that processes workers compensation claims and litigation) to exercise jurisdiction where an employee, or, as in this case, his or her estate, can show that an employer committed an “intentional tort” that injured the employee.

This is an important provision because it provides a jurisdictional bar to the filing of most claims in circuit courts for remedies due to work injuries.

As explained by the Court of Appeals in this opinion, there are two ways for a plaintiff to show that an employer specifically intended an injury. The plaintiff can provide direct evidence that the employer “had the particular purpose of inflicting an injury upon his employee.”  In the alternative, an employer’s intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence, i.e., that the employer “has actual knowledge that an injury is certain to occur, yet disregards that knowledge.”  Citing Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich. 149, 168, 180 (1996).

Here, the employee was electrocuted while he was repairing leads.  While the leads were not energized, his ladder was placed next to an energized “bus”.  No evidence was available to determine if the ladder actually came into contact with the bus.

The Court holds that neither the employer, nor any of the employer’s supervisors had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur, and disregarded that knowledge.

This is a brief summary of the case.  It is an important decision, especially since the Court of Appeals originally denied leave to appeal the trial court’s decision which would have allowed the suit to proceed in circuit court, rather than in the workers’ compensation agency.

This case comes out after a remand order by the Supreme Court directing the Court of Appeals to grant the previously denied application filed by the defendant, and on the heels of another important enunciation of the proper standard when applying the “intentional tort” exception to the exclusive remedy provision of workers’ compensation.

In June, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order summarily reversing the published decision of the Court of Appeals in Thomai.v.MIBA Hydramechanica Corp., et al, 303 Mich. App. 196 (2013), a case in which the Court of Appeals actually allowed a circuit court suit to proceed against a manufacturer on the basis that the employee had sufficient basis to proceed under the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Michigan Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq.

The plaintiff was injured while operating a machine at work.  The machine leaked oil onto the floor and workers were constantly required to wipe up the oil with rags to keep the floor and work area dry.  While cleaning up the oil, the plaintiff’s arm became trapped in the machine.  He filed suit in circuit court, which dismissed the action, citing MCL 418.131(1) (the “intentional tort” exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the WDCA).  The exclusive remedy in Michigan for workplace injuries is under the provisions of the WDCA.

In its published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute, as well as prior Supreme Court precedent, allows this exception to apply to “deliberate acts” by the employer that are shown to have occurred over a period of time. Here, the allegation is that the machine that injured the plaintiff was in disrepair and needed constant maintenance.  Since the employer knew about this, but did nothing about it, the act of the employer being deliberate could constitute the “intentional” act needed to bring the case out of the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA.

In its order, thomai.v.MIBA.order.reverse.coa, the Supreme Court notes the trial court gave the plaintiff sufficient time to prove the necessary elements of the intentional tort exception, and, after properly applying those elements to the facts that were in the record, properly dismissed the claim.  The Court therefore reverses the Court of Appeals’ decision noting:  “There is simply no evidence in the record to establish that the defendants wilfully disregarded knowledge that an injury was certain to occur to the plaintiff from his operation of the grooving machine.”

It is also worth noting, although the trial court did not dismiss on these grounds, that the Michigan Workers’ Compensation Agency has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over claims that should be filed under the WDCA, at least at the commencement of an action. On the basis of Michigan Constitutional authority of administrative agencies, as well as on the statutory jurisdiction of circuit courts, the question of compensation for injuries sustained by employees while at work resides exclusively within the purview of the workers’ compensation agency and the automatic benefits and remedies available under the WDCA.  If, during the course of discovery, it is determined that the “intentional tort” exception may apply, then, and only then, should a circuit court exercise jurisdiction over the claim.

If anyone has questions about the impact of these recent decisions on the issues of workers’ compensation claims, please call Carson J. Tucker at (734) 218-3605.

About cjtucker06

Owner of law firm since July 2014; Handles all types of appellate matters and assists other lawyers with complex litigation and insurance coverage issues; Admitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the State Bar of Michigan; Expertise in prosecuting and defending appeals with several significant successes in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals; Author of briefs amicus curiae in the Michigan Supreme Court for the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel and the Insurance Institute of Michigan; Represents Insurance Companies, Major International Business, Governmental Entities, Law Enforcement Officers and County Sheriffs. Board of Directors, Michigan Defense Trial Counsel Amicus Committee Co-Chair, Michigan Defense Trial Counsel Military - Retired Major in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps of the United States Army, Brigade Judge Advocate and Staff JAG officer for the Maneuver Training Center, Camp Grayling, Michigan; Recipient of the Army's Meritorious Service Medal (the highest medal of honor available to Soldiers serving in non-combat roles); 2012 Graduate of the Judge Advocate Officer Advanced Course, at The Judge Advocate Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia. United States Navy Reserves, Combat Warfare Qualification, January 1989 to July 2003 Former law clerk to Justice Stephen J. Markman, Michigan Supreme Court, Research Attorney, Michigan Court of Appeals. Insurance Coverage Associate Plunkett Cooney; Environmental Law Attorney at Squire Sanders, now Squire Patton Boggs; Master's Degree in Environmental Law; Environmental Law Scholar, ALI/ABA Washington, D.C., Juris Doctorate, Vermont Law School, Environmental Editor, Vermont Law Review; Treasurer and Finalist, Moot Court Advisory Board.
This entry was posted in May It Please the Court. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s